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STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS AS STRUCTURES OF 
RIGHTS 
Henry E. Smith* 
E are all used to thinking about law in terms of the primary 
rights and duties that obtain in the world at large. One has a 
right against everyone else not to be punched in the nose or to be 
run over by a negligent driver. Once these primary rights are vio- 
lated, a second set of rights and duties can arise out of a judgment 
or settlement. The victim now has a right to compensation from the 
tortfeasor. It is tempting to think that there is nothing interesting 
left to say. A judgment or settlement paid by the tortfeasor to the 
victim will compensate the victim according to the size of the dam- 
ages in present value terms and will deter potential tortfeasors in 
the same proportion. Whether a settlement is paid in a lump sum 
or periodically should not matter because it is the amount paid that 
impacts the goals of tort law. 
This picture is, as Professor Ellen Pryor's Article in this Sympo- 
sium ably demonstrates, far from adequate.1 How settlements are 
structured does impact the goals of deterrence and compensation, 
and lump-sum or "stretched-out" settlements are not equivalent 
for all purposes, even if they are equal in present value terms. In a 
lump-sum damage award, the defendant pays the damages to the 
plaintiff all at once, usually some time shortly after the settlement 
or judgment. In the three stretched-out methods of damage pay- 
out-structured settlements, settlement trusts, and periodic pay- 
ments mandated by statute-the plaintiff does not receive all of the 
money up front, but rather in multiple payments over some period 
of time (measured by a fixed number of years, or the plaintiff's life, 
or some combination thereof). The stretching out of the payments 
is meant to constrain plaintiff decisionmaking over consumption of 
the damage award and so involves adding higher-order decisions 
that constrain plaintiff's consumption decisions. All of these meth- 
ods involve the plaintiff and others constraining the decisions of 
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the future plaintiff. (Under a lump sum, the plaintiff is free to 
choose what to do with the money at any time, which, if consumed, 
will constrain future plaintiff choice.) If one thinks of the plaintiff 
as a succession of selves, any of the stretched out methods of pay- 
ing damages involves an earlier stage of the plaintiff, a judge, or 
others deciding how future stages of the plaintiff will decide on 
consumption. 
Where the three stretched out methods differ is in how this 
higher-order decisionmaking happens, in particular how many lev- 
els of higher-order decisionmaking can be identified. The most ar- 
ticulated mechanism is the settlement trust in which the defendant 
and others decide that the damage award will be used to fund a 
trust. Under the settlement trust, the trustee will pay out according 
to the plaintiff's needs as defined in the trust (for example, basic 
living expenses and medical care, but not gambling). The settle- 
ment trust can provide that the trustee will follow certain rules for 
payout or exercise some greater degree of discretion. If so, we have 
three levels of decisionmaking: Various actors set up the trust and 
decide how someone (the trustee) will decide on how the future 
stages of the plaintiff will decide on using the damages. 
Structured settlements and periodic payment schemes differ 
from settlement trusts by leaving out the intermediary decision- 
maker, but they differ from each other with respect to who the top- 
level decisionmaker is. In a structured settlement, the plaintiff and 
others decide to set up the schedule of payments, which are then 
automatic. The plaintiff is more or less involved in this decision 
and to that extent she is exercising self-paternalism directly over 
her future selves. Although empirical evidence is thin, there is a 
fear that many plaintiffs will squander a lump-sum settlement and 
wind up with insufficient funds for basic needs and medical care or 
might wind up overrelying on publicly funded programs.2 
In the periodic payment scheme, a statute directs a judge to set 
up an extended schedule for paying out damages under certain 
conditions (as with the passage of time or with the advent of medi- 
cal bills). Although preventing bad decisionmaking by plaintiffs 
over use of lump-sum damages has occasionally been advanced as 
2 See id. at 1779-80 for a summary of the empirical evidence. On the tax subsidy and 
the legislative history surrounding it, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. 
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a justification for mandatory periodic payments,3 periodic payment 
statutes were aimed more at reducing the value of suits and possi- 
bly reflect a concern about false and inflated claims; by not disburs- 
ing damages until plaintiff's future medical condition really does 
turn out to require expensive care, the periodic payment scheme is 
supposed to reduce false claims.4 This wait-and-see feature of man- 
dated periodic payments has not been shown to have a large im- 
pact on the severity of claims, but, when periodic payment is man- 
datory, it does reduce plaintiff choice.5 I will focus on the subsidized 
self-paternalism that is more characteristic of the more voluntary 
structured settlement and settlement trust devices. In any event, 
with mandatory periodic payments, again, there is no intermediate- 
level decisionmaker like the trustee. Here, the top-level decision- 
maker is not the plaintiff but rather the judge, as constrained by 
the legislature. 
Thus, these three methods of stretched-out payments differ in 
the number of levels of higher-order decisionmaking-decisions 
about decisions-and differ in who makes these higher-order deci- 
sions. Professor Pryor points out that structured settlements raise 
many questions about plaintiffs' ability to choose-questions that 
are related to but distinct from those involved in whether to ap- 
point a guardian or a guardian ad litem.6 In this Essay, I will argue 
that many of the unique characteristics and problems with struc- 
tured settlements reflect the articulation of multiple levels of dele- 
gated decisionmaking. Once we recognize the multi-tiered nature 
of the decisionmaking in setting up structured settlements, the tax 
and other legal advantages of the structured settlement can be seen 
as reflecting a policy of promoting self-paternalism in the face of 
moral hazard. 
See Roger C. Henderson, Designing a Responsible Periodic-Payment System for 
Tort Awards: Arizona Enacts a Prototype, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 21, 31-32 (1990). 
4 Mandatory periodic payments were one aspect of 1970s tort reform, which also in- 
cluded damage caps, abolition of the collateral source rule, alternative dispute resolu- 
tion provisions, and contingent fee limitations. See Glen O. Robinson, The Medical 
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 22-27 
(1986). 
Professor Patricia Danzon found that of various tort reform provisions, only dam- 
age caps and abolition of the collateral source rule were associated with a significant 
reduction in the severity of medical malpractice claims. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical 
Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 78 (1985). 
6 See generally Pryor, supra note 1. 
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Part I will articulate a framework for analyzing methods of pay- 
ing damages in terms of higher-order decisionmaking and will 
point out the similarities to other uses of delegating or constraining 
decisions in spendthrift trusts and in entitlement structures more 
generally. Part II will examine how current tax and bankruptcy law 
favor structured settlements, reflecting an apparent policy of subsi- 
dizing self-paternalism on the part of plaintiffs. These higher-order 
self-paternalistic decisions are supposed to constrain the lower- 
level consumption decisions by later stages of the plaintiff. Part III 
will turn to the question of how current law does or does not give 
effect to the constraints imposed by the higher-level decision to 
space out payments of damages. Finally, Part IV will point out 
some conflicts between effecting self-paternalism and other goals, 
which have led to an undermining of the effectiveness of structured 
settlements in encouraging plaintiff self-paternalism. 
I. THREE LEVELS OF DECISIONMAKING 
In the settlement trust, the structured settlement, and related 
devices, three levels of decisionmaking are required. First, there is 
the choice of how the money will be used on a day-to-day basis. 
Will the money be used for doctor's bills, other bills, gambled 
away, and so on? Second, there is a second-order choice about the 
consumption choice: Who will choose (and when) how to use the 
money? In some cases, a trustee will decide when to pay out to the 
plaintiff, leaving the day-to-day choice to the plaintiff-beneficiary. 
In other cases, the distinction between these two choices is less ap- 
parent: With a lump sum, the plaintiff will choose now whether to 
spend or save, in effect choosing whether to delegate the decision 
to a later stage of herself. Third, there is the choice of who makes 
the second-order choice: Who will make the choice of who makes 
the choice of how to use the money? For example, the judge (or 
the plaintiff) could decide to set up a trust so that a trustee will 
make the choice of when the plaintiff can make the everyday con- 
sumption choices. In this Part, I first illustrate higher-order deci- 
sionmaking and delegation in an analogous area-the spendthrift 
trust. Then I argue that higher-order decisionmaking is a more or 
less apparent feature of entitlement and liability structures that re- 
spond to different distributions of information and other decision- 
making ability. 
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That a settlement trust is an alternative to a structured settle- 
ment highlights the aspect of delegated decisionmaking that is fa- 
miliar in the area of trusts. One type of trust that bears an espe- 
cially close resemblance to settlement trusts (and structured 
settlements) is the spendthrift trust. A spendthrift trust is one in 
which a settlor creates the trust and gives the trustee instructions 
about paying out to the beneficiary; the trustee can be directed to 
pay for needs such as maintenance and education only as these 
needs arise, or the trustee can be given discretion to determine 
how much (including whether) to pay out to the beneficiary.7 The 
beneficiary has the choice of how to use each payment only after it 
is received, but does not have an interest that can be attached by 
creditors while the funds are still in the trust.8 The beneficial inter- 
est is designed not to be assignable or otherwise subject to anticipa- 
tion and is not part of the estate of a beneficiary in bankruptcy.9 
Settlors find the spendthrift trust particularly attractive if they 
worry about the ability of beneficiaries to manage money rather 
than fritter it away. Spendthrift trusts in someone other than the 
settlor have long been permitted in the United States, despite the 
famous early criticisms of Professor John Chipman Gray. He ob- 
jected vehemently that creditors might be deceived by the benefi- 
ciary's appearance of prosperity into lending to the beneficiary but 
later be unable to collect on a bad debt by attaching the trust.10 
(Chasing the payments as they are made would be prohibitively 
difficult.) 
7 
George T. Bogert, Trusts ?? 41-42 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing discretionary trusts 
and support trusts). 
See George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees ? 221 (rev. 2d ed., repl. vol. 1992); Austin Wakeman Scott & William Frank- 
lin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts ?? 151-155 (4th ed. 1987). 
9See Scott & Fratcher, supra note 8, ? 152.2, at 108. 
Professor Gray believed that spendthrift trusts were a potential disaster: 
That... men not paying their debts should live in luxury on inherited wealth, 
are doctrines as undemocratic as can well be conceived. They are suited to the 
times in which ... the law was administered in the interest of rich and powerful 
families. The general introduction of spendthrift trusts would be to form a privi- 
leged class, who could indulge in every speculation, could practise every fraud, 
and yet, provided they kept on the safe side of the criminal law, could roll in 
wealth. They would be an aristocracy, though certainly the most contemptible 
aristocracy with which a country was ever cursed. 
John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property 246-47 (Boston, Bos- 
ton Book Co. 1895). 
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Whether such false appearances were ever a major problem, they 
are not likely to be a major one in our era of credit checks and digi- 
tal information technology,1' and Professor Gray's disgust at the 
idea of the idle plutocracy that he feared spendthrift trusts would 
promote is not much of a concern in the tort settlement context.12 
More pressing problems are whether certain classes of claims 
against the beneficiary, such as those for child support, alimony, 
and by victims of the beneficiary's torts, should receive the spend- 
thrift protection; many states do not extend the anti-creditor pro- 
tections of a spendthrift trust to these sorts of claims.13 Thus, in the 
somewhat analogous situation of a plaintiff who is the beneficiary 
of a settlement trust or a structured settlement, future tort creditors 
of the plaintiff might have a stronger claim on the trust's assets or 
the annuity than would voluntary creditors. As we will see, another 
question is the plaintiff's role in setting up a settlement trust or a 
structured settlement. The greater the plaintiff's role, the more the 
plaintiff might-unpersuasively, I argue-be analogized to the settlor 
of a spendthrift trust. Traditionally, spendthrift trusts cannot be 
used to shield the settlor's own assets from creditors; most states 
do not extend protection to self-settled spendthrift trusts.14 More 
recently, however, even such self-settled spendthrift trusts have 
been permitted by legislation in Alaska and Delaware.15 
The settlement trust, one of the three methods of stretching out 
damage payments, has spendthrift-like limits on payouts for rea- 
sons similar to those that appeal to settlors of spendthrift trusts. 
The structured settlement, another of the three stretched-out dam- 
age payout methods, is similar to the spendthrift trust except that 
1 See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cogni- 
tive Perspectives, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 64-65 (1995). 12 
Gray, supra note 10, at vi ("One of the worst results of spendthrift trusts ... is the 
encouragement it gives to a plutocracy, and to the accumulation of a great fortune in 
a single hand, through the power it affords to rich men to assure the undisturbed pos- 
session of wealth to their children, however weak or wicked they may be."). 3 See Bogert & Bogert, supra note 8, ? 224, at 456-59. 
14 See Scott & Fratcher, supra note 8, ? 156, at 164-65. 
15 See Alaska Stat. ?? 13.36.035, 13.36.045, 13.36.310, 13.36.390, 34.40.110 (Michie 
2000); Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, ?? 3570-3576 
(2001). Controversy surrounds the question of whether these self-settled spendthrift 
trusts can be brought by creditors into a beneficiary's bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Mi- 
chael Sjuggerud, Defeating the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust in Bankruptcy, 28 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 977 (2001). 
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the schedule of payments is more mechanical, making the trustee's 
role fall out of the picture. The person setting up the structured set- 
tlement (the analog of the settlor of a trust) is, depending on the 
case, in part the plaintiff-beneficiary who is exercising some self- 
paternalism. But unlike in the typical self-settled spendthrift trust, 
the occasion for the trust and the funding will come not from the 
plaintiff-beneficiary but from the defendant (in satisfaction of the 
tort claim, to be sure). As Professor Pryor's Article emphasizes, a 
major issue in this area is even the extent of plaintiff decisionmak- 
ing in choosing a trust or a structure, as opposed to a lump sum.16 
Postjudgment rights and duties share this feature of layered de- 
cisionmaking with other rights structures, but exhibit more of these 
levels. In general, structures of rights and liabilities can be thought 
of in terms of delegated decisionmaking. This is most familiar from 
torts where there is an argument for placing liability on the 
"cheapest cost avoider," the party who can gather and act on in- 
formation about accident avoidance.7 By using strict liability and 
charging external harm to such a party, that party rather than the 
court can engage in the choice between incurring prevention costs 
or accident costs (because the latter will equal expected damages). 
Decisions are delegated to the liable party, and the liable party is in 
effect the residual claimant of the activity: The benefits as well as 
the costs of finding a new, cheaper method of prevention accrue to 
the liable party.18 By contrast, a reasonable person standard in- 
16 See Pryor, supra note 1, at 1767-92. 17 See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
135 n.73 (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liabil- 
ity in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1057-58 (1972); see also Ian Ayres & Paul M. Gold- 
bart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1 (2001) (analyzing single- and dual-chooser allocations to determine the most 
likely conditions to achieve allocative equilibrium); James E. Krier & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 474 (1995) ("[N]o liability rule can take advantage of both the 
best chooser and the lowest assessment costs."). 
18 See, e.g., Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing 
Property Rights, 84 Q.J. Econ. 611 (1970); Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: 
Trends and Implications, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (1970); see also Yoram Barzel, Eco- 
nomic Analysis of Property Rights 3-4 (2d ed. 1997) (identifying economic notion of 
property rights with residual claimancy); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & Econ. 327, 328 (1983) (defining "re- 
sidual claim"). 
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volves less delegation by requiring the fact finder (jury or judge) to 
evaluate potential precautionary measures. 
A delegation of even greater scope occurs with rights that we 
think of as property. By making someone the owner of an asset, we 
allow that actor (the "owner") to compare the potential uses of the 
asset, including transfer at whatever prices are being offered.19 
Where the set of uses is open-ended and difficult for the courts and 
other officials to evaluate, property rights allow for a high degree 
of decentralized decisionmaking. Much of the law of property rests 
on a foundation of rules that use very rough proxies that delegate 
decisions to owners: A boundary, literal or metaphorical, is a proxy 
for a wide range of uses, among which the owner may choose. The 
owner is the gatekeeper of the asset and officials need only worry 
about defending the proxies-such as presence over a boundary 
line in trespass-that demarcate the scope of the gatekeeper's 
rights.20 The owner can then contract with others for access to the 
asset. Within the constraints on the right to exclude-such as the 
absence of a right to exclude emergency personnel-courts protect 
the owner in her property, and the owner thus has a sphere of deci- 
sionmaking within which she is answerable to herself. This sphere 
of autonomous decisionmaking for the owner has been particularly 
emphasized in libertarian theories of property.2 
'9 Henry E. Smith, Execution versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2002). 
2( J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 74-75 (1997) (using gatekeeper meta- 
phor for property); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. 
Rev. 730 (1998) (adopting the gatekeeper metaphor to explain the distinctive nature 
of property rights); see also, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 39 
(1988) ("In a private property system, a rule is laid down that, in the case of each ob- 
ject, the individual person whose name is attached to that object is to determine how 
the object shall be used and by whom. His decision is to be upheld by the society as 
final."). 
21 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty 139-42, 238 (1998) (discuss- 
ing benefits flowing from the sphere of autonomy secured by property rights); Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 7-32 (1962) (arguing that economic arrangements 
based on private property are a necessary condition for a free society); Robert 
Nozick, Anarachy, State, and Utopia 149-231 (1974) (sketching an historical entitle- 
ment theory based on principles of justice in original acquisition of holdings, of trans- 
fer of holdings, and of rectification of injustice in holdings); Richard Pipes, Property 
and Freedom 118-20 (1999) (arguing for a close historical relationship between pri- 
vate property and notions of freedom). But see, e.g., Waldron, supra note 20, at 290- 
322 (1988) (discussing the relationship between private property and various types of 
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Further decisions to modify the basic exclusionary regime occur 
through self- or judicially-enforced contracts or through "fine tun- 
ing" doctrines such as those of nuisance or regulation.22 As in the 
case of the reasonable-person standard noted above, nuisance in- 
volves less delegation to owners than does trespass because offi- 
cials (here judges) make decisions over proper use directly.23 This 
decreased delegation would tend to happen when the stakes are 
high enough, and alternatives to official decisionmaking (such as 
private contracting) are comparatively costly enough to overcome 
the advantages of simple decisions delegated to owners.24 
What many of these cases of primary rights share is that the 
court or legislature is making a decision that is second-order: 
choosing the best chooser. In structured settlements and other 
post-judgment rights structures, however, it is useful to think of at 
least three levels of decisions. The three levels are easiest to sepa- 
rate where different actors are making decisions at different levels. 
Among the three devices with which we are concerned, this is like- 
liest to be true in a settlement trust. Here the court, aided by the 
parties and any guardians, chooses a trustee who will then choose 
when to disburse money to the plaintiff who will then choose how 
to use it.25 How a choice is made at a higher level can constrain 
choice at a lower level; sometimes that is the whole point. Thus, for 
example, the trustee in a spendthrift-type arrangement will choose 
liberty); G.A. Cohen et al., How Patterns Preserve Liberty, 11 Erkenntnis 5, 21 (1977) 
(arguing that Nozick's libertarian capitalism "sacrifices liberty to capitalism"). 22 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 394-97 (2001); see also Carol M. Rose, Rethink- 
ing Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 
Duke L.J. 1, 9-36 (delineating and comparing the cost of various strategies for manag- 
ing common environmental resources). 
Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13 (1985) (distinguishing mechanical and judgmental rules in 
trespass and nuisance, respectively, and attributing difference to higher levels of 
transaction costs in nuisance-type situations). 
24 Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 395-97 (analyzing nuisance as a system of use 
governance involving greater delineation and communication costs than trespass and 
explaining additional features of nuisance law not reflecting traditional transaction 
costs); see also Smith, supra note 19 (proposing framework based on exclusion and 
governance). 
25 If the payment made in a stretched-out payment method might be saved by the 
(later-stage) plaintiff or put into a new trust, there can be even more levels of deci- 
sionmaking. 
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to give less choice to earlier stages of the beneficiary than if dis- 
bursement were all at once. There may be certain things that the 
beneficiary over time cannot choose (certain investments, gambling, 
and so on) because the trustee's (or the settlor's) choice makes it 
prohibitively costly. 
II. SUBSIDIZING HIGHER-ORDER DECISIONS 
Distinguishing the three levels of decisions will allow an explana- 
tion of the favorable treatment of structured settlements in tax and 
bankruptcy. The favorable tax treatment subsidizes plaintiffs' self- 
paternalistic, higher-order choice to forego lower-order choices 
later on. 
Consider the tax advantage to structured settlements. This tax 
advantage goes beyond the favorable tax treatment of lump-sum 
tort awards. In the general case, nonpunitive awards to personal in- 
jury plaintiffs are not taxable.26 But in the case of a structured set- 
tlement, even delayed payments are entirely tax-free.27 This advan- 
tage goes beyond the nontaxation of a lump sum, because the 
proceeds of an invested lump sum are taxed, whereas a structured 
settlement can build up tax-free prior to withdrawal. The ostensi- 
ble policy behind the tax break is to avoid situations in which plain- 
tiffs squander large judgments and then wind up without sufficient 
resources to support themselves and their dependents or to pay for 
needed medical care.28 The public has some stake in not seeing 
plaintiffs exhaust a lump sum, particularly where the government 
will be expected then to provide further support and medical care.29 
Congress can be seen as making a bargain on behalf of the public 
with the plaintiff that in return for the lack of flexibility and choice 
at the first-order level of decisionmaking, the plaintiff can enjoy an 
additional advantage of tax-free build-up. As long as defendants do 
26 I.R.C. ? 104(a)(2) (2002). 27 Id. ? 130. 
28 
Interestingly, legislative history gave no clue as to the reason for the exclusion of 
the build-up in a structured settlement until a Joint Committee Report in 1999, which 
noted that the possibility of moral hazard in exhausting a lump-sum recovery and 
relying on government programs may justify a "subsidy" to encourage plaintiffs or 
their guardians to choose a structured settlement that would lessen this possibility. 
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., Tax Treatment of Structured 
Settlement Arrangements 7 (Comm. Print 1999). 29 
Id. 
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not manage to appropriate this benefit for themselves (which this 
Essay addresses later), the plaintiff's lack of autonomy in consump- 
tion is the quid for the tax-break quo.30 
The structured settlement is not the only area in which a tax 
preference is given where the concern is that people need extra en- 
couragement to provide for their futures. Retirement saving is 
heavily subsidized through the Tax Code and is even coerced 
though Social Security.3' The strongest argument for such carrots 
and sticks is that people have excessively high discount rates and so 
will not save enough for retirement.32 Further, there may be some 
concern that without forced saving people will over-depend on 
public programs.3 Likewise with structured settlements, where a 
plaintiff can be regarded as multiple selves and the earlier self will 
not take the later one's needs sufficiently into account, society may 
decide to encourage the earlier self to make sure that sufficient re- 
sources are available for the later self.34 Such a decision could re- 
30 As a carrot, the tax break is more favorable to plaintiffs' autonomy than other 
mandatory restrictions on freedom of contract such as the unconscionability doc- 
trine-which may similarly prevent people from taking moral-hazard type risks in the 
presence of a public welfare system. See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare 
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limi- 
tations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995). 
31 
See, e.g., I.R.C. ?? 401-404, 408, 410-416 (2002) (providing for favorable treat- 
ment of qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans); see also id. ? 72 
(2002) (providing for favorable treatment of annuities); id. ? 101 (2002) (providing 
favorable treatment to build-up on life insurance policies and exempting mortality 
gains from tax). 
32 The Social Security system forces a certain minimum level of saving by the indi- 
vidual but does nothing to ensure that each individual saves more than he would oth- 
erwise or that society as a whole saves more. See Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of 
Social Security Reform 29-30 (2000); see also Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, 
True Security: Rethinking American Social Insurance 255-78 (1999) (reviewing pro- 
posed reforms for securing retirement income and protecting Social Security bene- 
fits). 
33 On the various types of moral hazard involved, see Shaviro, supra note 32, at 
58-59. 
34 See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 37 
(rev. ed. 1984) (discussing alternatives to self-paternalism); Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1119-24 (2000) (discussing the prob- 
lem of dynamic inconsistency and multiple selves and noting which approaches privi- 
leging the earlier self would be consistent with rational choice theory and which 
would not); Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implications 
for Law and Public Policy, 3 Legal Theory 23 (1997) (arguing that multiple-self analy- 
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fleet paternalism or the moral hazard presented by relying on pub- 
lic programs. 
The other great advantage that law bestows on structured set- 
tlements is, as already mentioned, their exemption from the claims 
of creditors and their probable noninclusion in the estate of a tort 
plaintiff who winds up in bankruptcy.35 By not being reachable in 
bankruptcy, the future payments in a structured settlement bear a 
strong resemblance to other streams of payments such as some in- 
surance policies, beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts, and, to 
some extent, pensions.36 For the courts, the lack of control of the 
person who will receive the payments is a key to finding them un- 
reachable by creditors in bankruptcy.37 Structured settlements are 
exempt for similar reasons: The payments are meant for the plain- 
tiff's needs and the plaintiff does not have ownership or other con- 
trol over the payments in advance. 
Again, this treatment can be seen as part of the bargain implicit 
in the tax subsidy for structured settlements. The subsidy purchases 
the plaintiff's willingness to forego freedom of disposition, and the 
public thereby purchases the plaintiff's greater likelihood of being 
provided with resources and nonreliance on public welfare pro- 
grams. If so, it makes sense that this public claim might, in effect, 
have priority over some claims in bankruptcy. As we will see, al- 
lowing voluntary creditors access to the settlement in bankruptcy 
would increase the plaintiff's ability to undo the transaction; for 
example, a plaintiff could borrow for current consumption (gam- 
sis is consistent with rational choice theory, and discussing the implications of indi- 
viduals having both a more short-term oriented "child" self and a more long-term ori- 
ented "adult" self); Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in 
a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 1, 6-10 (1984) 
(noting problems of different selves and its relationship to policy choices). 3 See, e.g., In re Belue, 238 B.R. 218 (S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Alexander, 227 B.R. 658, 
661 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
36 See 11 U.S.C. ?? 522, 541(c)(2) (2000); Restatement (Second) of Trusts ?? 150-55 
(1959). In general, the question is whether state law provides anti-alienation features 
for a given right that would place it outside the property of the estate for purposes of 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 
(1992). 37 
See, e.g., George R. Pitts, Rights to Future Payment as Property of the Estate 
Under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 Am. Bankr. L.J. 61 (1990). For an ar- 
gument that a class of assets even broader than those to which the debtor does not 
have present access should be unavailable to creditors in bankruptcy, see Thomas H. 
Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 260-64 (1986). 
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bling or whatever), securing the debt with the expected payments.3 
If the lender cannot touch the payments in bankruptcy, such trans- 
actions anticipating the payments will become more costly. Putting 
the settlement funds out of the reach of creditors makes it more 
difficult for the plaintiff to undo the structure and to thereby defeat 
the purpose of the subsidy of which he has taken advantage. 
Not including a structured settlement in a bankrupt's estate can 
be viewed as an advantage or a disadvantage. Ex post, a plaintiff in 
bankruptcy would prefer not to lose the settlement. Before bank- 
ruptcy, a plaintiff might decide that he would like to alienate the 
right to the settlement payments. And, even earlier, at the time of 
the decision between a lump sum or a structured settlement, the 
plaintiff might prefer the structure even if it means losing the flexi- 
bility of alienability later on. At this earlier stage, it is not clear at 
all as a normative matter that structured settlements should receive 
the tax or special treatment in bankruptcy if the plaintiff did not 
give up any flexibility. Reducing the flexibility to squander funds is 
the point of the tax subsidy for structured settlements. 
It is also instructive to push the analysis back even further and 
compare the plaintiff deciding on the type of settlement payout 
mechanism, on the one hand, with an uninjured person in other- 
wise similar circumstances on the other. Almost by definition, the 
tort victim did not choose to be injured. In this case, we might say 
that a sort of "realization requirement" comes into play. That is, 
one's body, safety, and human capital are assets one owns, which 
are protected by tort law. In the case of an ordinary non-self asset, 
selling the asset is a realization event (in the tax sense), and tax on 
any gain (or potential deduction of losses) happens then. Without a 
voluntary transaction, however, we are more reluctant to impose 
tax: Annual reporting and valuation may be difficult, and one may 
not have cash on hand to pay the tax.39 Thus in an involuntary con- 
text such as a tort recovery, the Tax Code is more generous in its 
38 A plaintiff in bankruptcy, however, may not be able to discharge a debt to a set- 
tlement purchaser if his intent is to defraud settlement purchasers. See In re Brooks, 
248 B.R. 99 (W.D. Mich. 2000). Note that in Brooks, assignment may have been less 
problematic in the first place since some, but not all, of the agreements contained 
anti-assignment clauses. Id. at 103. 
39 See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940); United States Dep't of 
the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 75-76 (1977). 
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treatment of such realizations. For example, in the case of assets 
like land, a tort recovery is a realization event but one gets the ad- 
vantage of freely using basis against the recovery.40 In the case of 
personal physical injury, as mentioned, the Code does not tax 
compensatory awards at all. 
The size of the subsidy element here depends in part on the tax- 
ability of what the tort award replaces. The nontaxation of even 
the build-up on the settlement is less of a subsidy to the extent that 
it replaces nontaxable imputed income. We can think of the self as 
an asset, as a stock from which a flow of services gives rise to in- 
come. This income can be imputed, as in walking one's dog or 
cleaning one's house, in which case there is no tax. Or the services 
can lead to income, for example wages, on which there will be tax. 
Much of a personal physical injury recovery, however, is for lost 
wages.4 
Whatever the size of this element of subsidy in the tax treatment 
of structured settlements, the comparison to the situation of a non- 
injured person helps explain the lack of alienability of the struc- 
tured settlements. A noninjured person has the intact asset or 
"stock" from which the flow is expected, but in many cases the 
value of that stock is hard to measure. For this reason, the person 
may be able to borrow less against the value of these future flows. 
Nor can the stock be pledged or alienated because that would con- 
flict with our policies of a fresh start in bankruptcy, and more ex- 
treme examples raise the specter of slavery. A plaintiff with a lump 
sum has more ability to borrow or consume now rather than later 
than would the corresponding noninjured person. All else being 
equal, this extra liquidity is a plus, but if there are independent rea- 
sons to restrict such transactions, the plaintiff is not losing an abil- 
ity that a noninjured person freely enjoys. 
So putting all these strands together, the Tax Code offers the 
plaintiff a bargain in which the plaintiff gives up the extra alienabil- 
40 See Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 727 (1947), acq., 1948-1 C.B. 2. In a 
voluntary disposition, basis must be allocated equitably between the disposed and re- 
tained portions of the property according to relative value. Treas. Reg. ? 1.61-6(a) 
(2001). 
41 Other components of recovery, to the extent that they are allowed, may correlate 
with lost wages, but this might be an attempt to associate a monetary amount with lost 
imputed income. 
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ity and flexibility that come with a lump sum as opposed to one's 
uninjured self as an asset (and perhaps loses some more flexibility 
over this amount), in return for a package consisting of favorable 
tax treatment of the build-up in the fund and protection in bank- 
ruptcy. How much flexibility a given plaintiff has foregone will de- 
pend on how easily that plaintiff could have borrowed in the unin- 
jured state, and how costly the lack of flexibility under the structure 
would be is often best known by the individual plaintiff.42 For this 
reason and out of general respect for plaintiff autonomy, these de- 
cisions are within a sphere that is best left to plaintiffs themselves, 
unless serious incapacity is shown or can be presumed (as in the 
case of minors). Balancing the costs against the tax advantage is 
best done by the plaintiff as long as the plaintiff can be informed of 
those aspects of the decision (the tax and bankruptcy aspects) 
about which the plaintiff does not have an informational advantage 
to begin with. 
III. CONSTRAINING LOWER-LEVEL DECISIONS 
How costly it will be for a lower-level decisionmaker to evade 
the restrictions put in place by higher-level decisionmakers will de- 
pend on enforcement and transaction costs. As long as there is no 
market in income streams such as those from structured settle- 
ments and the plaintiff finds it too difficult to borrow against the 
stream, the plaintiff must simply wait for the funds to be disbursed. 
With the rise of a market in financial products, however, and fac- 
toring transactions in particular, the plaintiff may acquire the abil- 
ity to undo the spendthrift aspect of the settlement.43 Financial the- 
ory indicates the size of the lump sum to which any given stream of 
42 One aspect of the flexibility problem is that plaintiffs opting for the structured set- 
tlement run more risk from inflation than would someone who invested a lump sum in 
equities (or a noninjured person receiving wages). See, e.g., Dirk Yandell, Advan- 
tages and Disadvantages of Structured Settlements, 5 J. Legal Econ. 71, 73 (1995). 
Recently this has been partially alleviated through shortening the duration of the 
structure, or through use of a variable income annuity. See Joseph Kelner & Robert 
S. Kelner, Variable Income Annuity Structured Settlements, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 2000, 
at 3, 3-4. 
43 
See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Selling Structured Settlements: The Uncertain Ef- 
fect of Anti-Assignment Clauses, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 787 (2001); Leo Andrada, Note, 
Structured Settlements: The Assignability Problem, 9 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 465 
(2000). 
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income would be equivalent in terms of present discounted value, 
and often it is only transaction costs that are the main barrier to 
easy conversion between the one and the other.44 But with the de- 
velopment of financial and related markets, transaction costs are a 
decreasing barrier to the translation from income stream to lump 
sum. The alternative to relying on transaction costs is direct en- 
forcement. 
Relying on transaction costs to prevent undesired alienation is 
becoming generally less possible. Developed markets in financial 
products tend to break down the distinction between fixed and 
contingent payments. Thus, the tax law has long made crucial dis- 
tinctions between fixed and contingent payments,4 but here too as 
transaction costs have lowered and markets in financial products 
have developed, the form of a payment as fixed or contingent is 
more manipulable and difficult to classify and police for tax pur- 
poses.46 Indeed, in both tax and property law, transaction costs 
themselves can sometimes be regarded as a potential method of 
enforcement: If frictions prevent undesired adjustment or actions 
on the part of the regulated actor, the law need not directly act to 
prevent those actions.47 Property law sometimes uses a combination 
of direct enforcement and "natural" frictions to prevent opportun- 
istic behavior.48 For example, copyright needed less enforcement in 
an era in which copying itself was costly and the copy less useful 
than an original (for example, photocopying an entire book); with 
44 
See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regula- 
tion of Trading Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1411, 1427-30 (1996) 
(reporting empirical studies of significant impact of discounted anticipated cost of 
trading of stocks on their prices); William F. Landsea & David L. Roberts, Inflation 
and the Present Value of Future Economic Damages, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 93, 99-102 
(1982) (explaining the difficulties in calculating present values for lump-sum awards 
and noting the costliness of expert testimony). 
45 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 460, 465-73 (1993). 
46 See id. at 473 (summarizing the challenge to the income tax that full contractual 
implementation of financial equivalences would pose). 
See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1312 (2001) (discussing how tax systems can rely on some transaction costs as 
barriers to undesirable tax planning). 48 
Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 
29 J. Legal Stud. 131, 131-54, 161-69 (2000). 
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the rise of digital technology, if copying is to be prevented, the law 
can no longer depend on these extralegal frictions to do the job.49 
Similarly, with structured settlements, the ability of plaintiffs to 
precommit to the structure can no longer depend as much as it has 
on the frictions involved in undoing the structure. Thus, as the pos- 
sibility of borrowing against, selling, or otherwise anticipating 
structured settlements becomes more plausible, either the promo- 
tion of structured settlements must find a new justification or meas- 
ures must be taken to ensure that the subsidized self-paternalism in 
the structured settlement is carried through. Such measures could 
include more certain enforcement of anti-assignment clauses or 
taxation of factoring transactions. Less mandatorily, one could give 
plaintiffs a choice between assignable and nonassignable structured 
settlements. If the assignment is inconsistent with the policy behind 
the tax break and bankruptcy exemption for structured settle- 
ments, then the menu could be (1) a tax- and bankruptcy-favored 
non-assignable structured settlement or (2) an assignable struc- 
tured settlement without the tax and bankruptcy advantages. 
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOALS 
The structure of rights in structured settlements involves multi- 
tiered delegation in which the plaintiff trades some lower-level 
freedom for a subsidy. This multi-tier analysis allows us to see 
where the goals of the law of structured settlements sometimes 
conflict and to point to some possible resolutions. 
Least surprisingly, there is an (apparent) paradox of freedom in 
structured settlements. In this regard, structured settlements are no 
different from other situations in which an actor at time one binds 
her future selves. In particular, structured settlements involve an 
element of self-paternalism often likened to the story of Ulysses 
49Technology may make violation easier but may also make self-help protection 
easier. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and 
Analog Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
211, 236-37 (2001); see also David D. Friedman, Law's Order 144 (2000) (discussing 
the development of encryption technology to protect certain intellectual property); 
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1999) (dis- 
cussing the use of self-help systems to reduce the number of copyright violations). 
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and the Sirens.50 The difference between Ulysses and the plaintiff 
in the structured settlement is that, so far as we know, Ulysses did 
not get a tax break to encourage being bound. In any event, maxi- 
mizing freedom in later, lower-level decisions may not maximize 
freedom in earlier, higher-level decisions. Freedom includes the 
freedom to bind oneself (including one's later self), as is familiar 
from the practices of promising and contracting. 
Relatedly, lowering transaction costs does not always promote 
contracting if there are multiple levels involved. Lowering transac- 
tion costs may make the selling or other anticipation of the struc- 
tured settlement easier. But this means that the higher-level "deal" 
between the government and the plaintiff (or between the defen- 
dant and the plaintiff) to provide for a stream of unanticipatable 
payments becomes harder to make stick. Although this problem in 
its general form goes beyond the scope of this Essay, it is notewor- 
thy that one of the recurring difficulties in the literature on transac- 
tion-cost economics is related to transaction costs operating on 
multiple levels. In a frictionless world, one might think that breach 
would be costless, but in a zero-transaction cost world, one should 
be able to create frictions frictionlessly.5 In the real, positive trans- 
action-cost world we live in, the point remains that lowering trans- 
action costs for one type of choice may make it more costly to im- 
plement the enforcement of a prior, higher-level choice not to 
allow that choice. 
If these problems become large enough, we can get a situation in 
which promoting alienability mandatorily does not promote easy 
alienation. Generally, if I could not restrict the alienability of an 
asset I transfer, I might not be willing to part with it in the first 
place. Bailments and leases can be thought of as partial alienations 
that both depend on partial alienation (and may in some circum- 
stances be promoted by further anti-alienation devices). In the con- 
text of structured settlements, if plaintiffs cannot alienate their 
50 See, e.g., Jon Elster, supra note 34, at 1-111 (discussing self-paternalism and using 
the story of Ulysses and the sirens as a primary illustration). 5' For a dramatic example of this problem, compare Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey 
L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & Econ. 175 (1981) (ar- 
guing that for certain assumed values the Coase Theorem does not hold when three 
parties contest the use of a resource and coalitions are permitted), with R.H. Coase, 
The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & Econ. 183 (1981) 
(arguing that binding contracts can prevent cycling through coalitions). 
Structured Settlements 
ability to alienate structured settlements, the tax subsidy could be- 
come unattractive to Congress and structured settlements could 
conceivably lose their tax break (provided that the structured set- 
tlement industry does not manage to defend it). If the subsidy is 
part of a bargain between the plaintiff and the government (or the 
public), which the latter would not enter into unless the former 
agrees not to alienate, future deals of this sort may lose their at- 
tractiveness. Without knowing more empirical details of the politi- 
cal economy of such subsidies it is hard to say what the effect 
would be, but, at any rate, the point is that there is no necessary 
link between promotion of alienability of assets across the board 
and promoting structured settlements. Allowing plaintiffs to opt 
into anti-alienation may smooth these higher-order plaintiff- 
government "transactions" alienating the flexibility of the lump 
sum to create structured settlements.52 
Furthermore, in structured settlements, doctrines aimed at en- 
forcing the lower-level constraints on plaintiffs can have the effect 
of interfering with plaintiffs' participation in and benefiting from 
the higher-level decisionmaking that sets up the structured settle- 
ment. Take the constructive receipt doctrine, under which a plain- 
tiff with too much control over the resources will lose the benefits 
of tax-free build-up.53 The problem is that defendants can use this 
as a stick to make sure that plaintiffs are not very involved with set- 
ting up the structure: If the plaintiff knows the cost and details of 
the funding of the structure, the plaintiff might be deemed to have 
too much control and so lose the benefit. Thus, carrying the con- 
structive receipt doctrine that far-and the IRS probably would 
*2 Restraints on alienation may implicate the numerus clausus principle (requiring a 
fixed standard set of property forms), but trusts and possibly structured settlements 
may have features that keep down third-party information costs. Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (2001). Also, potential purchas- 
ers of settlements are a select and expert audience. See Henry E. Smith, The Lan- 
guage of Property: Form, Context, and Audience Design, 55 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcom- 
ing Apr. 2003). 
See Robert W. Wood, Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement Payments 
357, 361-66 (2d. ed. 1998) (discussing constructive receipt). 
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not but it is not entirely clear at this time54-would likely interfere 
with the purpose of the structured settlement option in the first 
place. This would be especially so if the idea of subsidizing the 
plaintiff's decision to accept a structured settlement, rather than 
mandating it, reflects an effort to promote self-paternalism while 
minimizing the effect on the plaintiff's autonomy.55 The danger of 
plaintiffs losing their role is all the greater because defendants are 
often repeat players.56 
Furthermore, after the injury the plaintiff and defendant are 
locked into a bilateral monopoly, and there is a danger that the de- 
fendant will capture the tax benefit of the structured settlement. 
Practitioners are unabashed about promoting the virtues of struc- 
tured settlements as providing benefits for both sides and thus mak- 
ing settlement easier.57 Ironically, the U.S. government was among 
the large self-insured defendants who sought to capture for them- 
selves the benefits of the tax exclusion of the growth in the annuity 
funding a structured settlement.58 Although it is conceivable that 
54 Richard B. Risk, Jr., Structured Settlements: The Ongoing Evolution from a Li- 
ability Insurer's Ploy to an Injury Victim's Boon, 36 Tulsa L.J. 865, 894 & n.149 
(2001). 
55 Relatedly, under the economic benefit doctrine, one must include in income a 
fund in which one's rights have vested (become nonforfeitable), see Sproull v. Com- 
missioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952), but this has been 
overridden by the Code and Regulations, see 26 C.F.R. ? 1.468B-l(c)(2) (2002). See 
generally, Risk, supra note 54, at 895 (arguing that the economic benefit doctrine does 
not apply to qualified settlement funds because "[i]t is well settled in law that, when a 
statute or regulation is more current and more specific, the statute or regulation over- 
rides the common law"). 
56 Professor Pryor discusses the dangers to plaintiffs' role in the decisionmaking over 
settlements. Pryor, supra note 1, at 1792-1813. 
57 See, e.g., Barbara D. Goldberg & Kenneth Mauro, Utilizing Structured Settle- 
ments, in Evaluating and Settling a Personal Injury Case: Plaintiffs' and Defendants' 
Perspectives 2000, at 13, 20-21 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Se- 
ries No. HO-006K, 2000) ("Ideally, the tax savings on this investment [funding the 
structured settlement] over time could be split between the plaintiff and the defen- 
dant thereby resulting in a savings to both litigants. Or, in other words, for less money 
the plaintiff could receive a larger benefit. This would benefit both sides!"). 
5S Richard Risk quotes from a Memorandum from Jeffrey Axelrad, Director, Torts 
Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Federal Torts Claims Act 
("FTCA") Staff, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Agency Counsel, (May 10, 
2000), which says: 
The ability of a tax-free lifetime series of annuity payments, for example, should 
not be conferred on a plaintiff without an offsetting benefit to the government: 
that is, an adequate quid pro quo. You should be aware of all of the govern- 
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Congress would provide a subsidy for settlement, there is little evi- 
dence of such a purpose and it is unclear that such a purpose would 
focus on personal injury litigation or require spread-out payments. 
Not only is it less than clear that the tax subsidy was meant to 
promote settlement, but there is also a potential negative impact 
on deterrence if the defendant captures the tax benefit. If the de- 
fendant can capture a tax benefit resulting in lower expected liabil- 
ity, the incentive to take care will be reduced.9 Even if one could 
identify contexts in which tort law is over-deterring, subsidizing 
structured settlements would seem a very clumsy way of addressing 
that problem, especially since it makes the deterrent depend more 
than ever on the bargaining power of the defendant. Thus, the con- 
structive receipt doctrine along with bilateral monopoly (and pos- 
sible defendant repeat play) tend to mean that the tax subsidy for 
structured settlements is capturable by the defendant, which re- 
duces deterrence, encourages capture efforts, and does not serve 
the self-paternalism-encouraging purpose of the subsidy. 
A minimal solution to these problems would be to make the 
plaintiff's higher-level choice very clear when the settlement is be- 
ing worked out. Where the public is in on the deal, defaults can be 
used to allow plaintiffs to choose benefits with strings attached or 
no benefits. Then, the chosen deal can be enforced, for example by 
taxing factoring transactions that are inconsistent with the plain- 
tiff's choice (and not taxing otherwise).60 The clearer the menu, the 
ment's interests and take them into account when you negotiate a settlement on 
behalf of the United States. 
Risk, supra note 54, at 872 n.27. Professor Risk notes that the federal government's 
insistence on getting a reduction in the overall amount it spends on a settlement to 
offset the plaintiff's tax benefits under Section 130 of the Tax Code "appears to be in 
direct conflict with congressional intent as expressed in the Joint Committee on Taxa- 
tion document, which considers the tax benefit a 'subsidy' designed to encourage the 
injury victim to accept periodic payments." Id. 
'9 Compare this to the collateral source rule, under which a plaintiff can collect from 
a defendant without reduction for compensation from insurers or other non- 
defendant third parties. Making the defendant pay for the full harm is required by de- 
terrence. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Ex- 
traordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 44-45 (1990). 
60 Alternatively, one might try to recapture the benefits of the tax subsidy to the 
plaintiff by taxing the plaintiff, but this is likely to be more difficult than an excise tax 
on the transaction. For a summary of existing recapture rules in the Tax Code and a 
proposal for their use in household taxation, see Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing 
in Household Taxation, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 145,191-92 & n.167 (1998). 
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less we have to worry about being paternalistic rather than merely 
enforcing self-paternalism of the plaintiff's choosing. 
Further, if we take the tax subsidy for structured settlements se- 
riously, then the constructive receipt doctrine should not be 
pressed so far that it can become a weapon in the hands of sophis- 
ticated defendants. Particularly in an era when self-settled spend- 
thrift trusts seem to be arriving on the scene, it makes little sense to 
enforce such heavy restrictions on tort victims, who have not even 
chosen to be in the position of having the (higher-order) choice of 
mechanism for settlement payment. 
Finally, a reflexive policy of promoting "alienability" of all in- 
tangible property rights should be rethought. We can promote 
higher-order contracting by allowing plaintiffs to contract away 
their ability to change (alienate) the structured settlement once it is 
set up. Again, this requires that plaintiffs-at the time of judg- 
ment-have information about the alternatives. If so, the apparent 
restriction on alienation is a freely chosen one, as part of an im- 
plicit bargain in return for a tax subsidy. 
CONCLUSION 
Structured settlements are structures of rights in which the Tax 
Code subsidizes certain self-paternalistic choices by plaintiffs. 
When one keeps in mind that the decisions here operate on multi- 
ple levels, it is clear how legal effort should be directed at the ap- 
propriate level in order to maximize the chance that plaintiffs will 
be provided for, that the public will not need to intervene further, 
and that defendants will face the correct deterrent prices and sanc- 
tions in their activity decisions. 
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